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The Eroding Uniformity of the
Uniform Commercial Code
By JOHN C. MiNAHAN, JR.*
Although the Uniform Commercial Code was drafted in an
effort to provide uniformity of commercial law. in the United
States, the uniformity which was initially engendered by the
enactment of the Code is presently giving way to wide-spread
disparity in the commercial law among the states. In this arti-
cle John C. Minahan, Jr. explores the reasons for the failure to
achieve uniformity of commercial law under the UCC and sug-
gests means by which the uniformity mandate of the Code may
be preserved.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several years ago Karl Llewellyn summarized the reasons
favoring the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) in seven words: clarity, simplicity, convenience, fair-
ness, completeness, accessibility, and uniformity.' Relative to
pre-Code statutory and decisional law, the UCC project was
highly successful when evaluated in terms of these criteria.
Time has, however, worked to the Code's disfavor. Over the
years the UCC's statement of the law has become less complete
as state and federal legislators promulgate rules which su-
persede Code provisions. One result of such legislation is that
commercial law becomes less accessible since one must canvass
statutes extrinsic to the Code in search of superseding or sup-
plementing provisions. The same observations may be made
with respect to the developing body of decisional law. In a
* Associate with Kutak, Rock, Cohen, Campbell, Garfinkle & Woodward,
Omaha, Nebraska. B.S., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Creighton Law
School; LL.M., Harvard Law School. Much of the preparation of this article was
completed during the 1976-77 academic year during which the author was an Associate
Professor of Law at Vermont Law School. The author would like to express gratitude
to his research assistant Charles E. Shafer.
I Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROS. 687
(1948). Llewellyn developed the same seven concepts before the New York Law Revi-
sion Commission. 1 STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION AND
RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5-18 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as N.Y.L.R.C. HEARINGS (1954)].
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common law system it is the Code as construed by the courts
which must be considered, and with the passage of time more
and more conflicting decisional law dealing with the Code de-
velops. The simplicity, clarity, accessibility and convenience of
which Professor Llewellyn spoke are slowly yielding to com-
plexity, obscurity and inaccessibility. Most disturbingly, the
uniformity of law which the Code initially engendered is yield-
ing to disparity among the enacting states. It has now been
three-quarters of a century since the first uniform commercial
statutes were promulgated by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. During that time it has
become evident that, at least in the United States, 2 complete
uniformity of commercial law is a highly illusive objective.
A. The Historical Objective of Uniformity of Commercial
Law
The necessity and desirability of uniform substantive rules
governing commerce were early recognized in the United
States. In 1891 the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws was formed and immediately undertook a
project to draft a Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
(UNIL), which was recommended for adoption in 1896. The
UNIL was followed in 1906 by the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act and the Uniform Sales Act, and in 1909 by the Uniform
Bills of Lading Act and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. In
1918 the Uniform Conditional Sales Act was completed, and in
1933 the Uniform Trust Receipts Act was completed. The
American Bankers Association sponsored the Bank Collection
Code, which was completed in 1929.
The quest for uniformity through the promulgation of the
Uniform Acts by the National Conference of Commissioners
did not, however, meet with success. The Acts were not widely
enacted,3 and among enacting jurisdictions there was great var-
2 Contrast the British experience under the Bills of Exchange Act and the Sale of
Goods Act where, it has been suggested, substantial uniformity was achieved through-
out the British Empire. Rossman, Uniformity of Law: An Elusive Goal, 36 A.B.A.J.
175, 176 (1950).
The Uniform Acts met with varying degrees of success in state legislatures:
[Vol. 65
THE ERODING UNIFORMITY
iance in the judicial construction of particular provisions of the
Acts. Decisional law involving the UNIL illustrates the prob-
lems which characterized the first stumbling steps toward codi-
fication. The UNIL was promulgated in 1896 and had been
adopted in every state by 1924. However, by 1914 courts were
reaching different substantive results under the UNIL and, in
cases clearly controlled by the Act, courts often failed to cite
the UNIL or cases decided under it. 4 For example, on the issue
of whether an antecedent debt constituted value, there had
been some eighty-six cases decided by 1914 in jurisdictions
which had enacted the UNIL. The decisions have been broken
down as follows: In thirty-five cases UNIL Section 25, which
was pertinent to the issue, was not even cited; of the fifty-one
decisions which cited Section 25, only four of them cited any
cases which had been decided under that section. Moreover,
some opinions were in accord with the UNIL while others were
not.' By the time the UCC was prepared, there were conflicting
judicial elaborations with respect to over eighty of the UNIL's
196 sections.6
B. Uniformity Under the Uniform Commercial Code
Enactment of the UCC during the 1950's and 1960's had
the immediate effect of replacing the conflicting commercial
Number of
Uniform Act States Enacting
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act ................................... 48
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act ...................................... 48
Uniform Sales Act .................................................... 34
Uniform Bills of Lading Act ........................................... 31
Uniform Stock Transfer Act ........................................... 48
Uniform Conditional Sales Act ........................................ 10
Uniform Trust Receipts Act ........................................... 32
Bank Collection Code ................................................. 18
1 Hargest, Keeping the Uniform State Laws Uniform, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 178, 182
(1927) (on the failure of courts to consider the Uniform Acts); Eaton, The Attitude of
the Courts with Reference to an Antecedent Debt as Constituting Value Under the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, 23 YALE L.J. 293 (1914).
Eaton, supra note 4, at 316.
Schnader, The New Commerical Code: Modernizing Our Uniform Commercial
Acts, 36 A.B.A.J. 179, 181 (1950). For an analysis of the "uniformity" provisions in the
prior uniform acts and their effects upon the courts' obligations, see Sicherman,
Construction of Clause in Uniform State Laws Providing for Uniformity of
Interpretation, 2 A.B.A.J. 60 (1916).
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law of the various states with a relatively uniform statute. The
Code was drafted in
an effort . . to break up ...[the Uniform] Acts, to mod-
ernize them, to put them into a coherent and accessible form,
to add to them a large body of material that should have been
put into them before but was not, and to clarify the frequent
case law disputes that have arisen.'
The enactment of the Code, however, did n6t provide perma-
nent freedom from the problems of lack of uniformity which
characterized the experience under the various Uniform Acts.
Although there is today a great deal of uniformity in the comi-
mercial law of the states, there is at the same time an expand-
ing amount of unjustified disparity in both statutory and deci-
sional law under the Code.
Decisional law involving the Code is rapidly growing, yet
an examination of the decisions of the past 5 years reveals that
once again "the courts on identical statutes are reaching dia-
metrically opposite conclusions.. . ."I Consider the following
illustrative issues upon which there are currently conflicts in
decisional law: Does the sale of a radio station constitute a
"sale of goods" within the scope of Article 2?1 Is an agreement
to provide data processing services within the scope of Article
2?1° Are farmers "merchants" within the meaning of Section 2-
1 Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779 (1953) (address
delivered at the 1952 convention of the Tennessee Bar Association).
8 Sicherman, supra note 6, at 61. Shortly after the promulgation of the UNIL, one
commentator, disturbed by developing decisional law, remarked:
With the passage of time, these decisions began to reveal an unexpected and
formidable peril. The whole fabric, the very conception of uniformity, was
being menaced by the strange attitude of the courts. Once more the hydra-
heads of uncertainty were showing themselves: the courts, on identical stat-
utes, were reaching diametrically opposite conclusions; cases from other
states on the precise point were being ignored, and matters clearly within its
language were being disposed of on the bases of ancient decisions.
Id. A later commentator made the same general observations about decisional law
under the Code. Note, Disparate Judicial Construction of the Uniform Commercial
Code-The Need for Federal Legislation, 1969 UTAH L. REv. 722.
1 Foster v. Colo. Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967) (yes); Crooks v.
Chapman Co., Inc., 185 S.E.2d 787 (Ga. 1971) (no); Field v. Golden Triangle Broad-
casting, Inc., 305 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1973) (no).
," Clements Auto Co. v. Serv. Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971) (yes);
Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd,
443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971) (no).
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201?" Does the Code require an "as is" disclaimer to be
conspicious?' 2 Do implied warranties apply to injuries to
animals?' 3 Does a payee have any interest in a negotiable in-
strument prior to delivery?" Does postdating a check provide
a transferee with notice of a defense?'5 Does the "any person"
language in UCC Section 3-406 apply to a certifying bank?'"
Does the term "equipment" constitute a sufficient description
of collateral in a security agreement? 7 May an auto dealer who
purchases cars from another auto dealer qualify as a buyer in
the ordinary course of business?"8 When does the 10-day grace
period in UCC Section 9-312(4) commence to run if the collat-
eral was in the possession of the debtor before the execution of
a purchase money security agreement?' 9 These and other con-
flicts of authority2 reflect an increasing lack of harmony in the
"1 Loeb & Co. v. Schneiner, 17 UCC REP. SERV. 897" (Ala. 1975) (no); Sierens v.
Clausen, 328 N.E.2d 559 (Ill. 1975) (yes); Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 318 N.E.2d
428 (Ohio 1973) (yes)..
,1 Osborne v. Genevie, 289 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1974) (yes); Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardi-
nale Trucking Corp., 7 UCC REP. SERV. 1257 (N.J. 1970) (yes); Smith v. Sharpensteen,
521 P.2d 394 (Okla. 1974) (no).
,1 Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1968) (yes); Leach v. Wiles, 429
S.W.2d 823 (Tenn. 1968) (no).
" Rex Smith Propane v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 372 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Tex.
1974) (no); Kampfe v. United States, 14 UCC REP. SERV. 1371 (D. Mont. 1974) (no);
Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(no); Harris v. Hill, 199 S.E.2d 847 (Ga. 1973) (yes).
,1 Briand v. Wilde, 268 A.2d 896 (N.H. 1970) (yes); Northern Currency Exch., Inc.
v. Strickman, 9 UCC REP SERV. 705 (N.Y. 1971) (no).
,s Brower v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 311 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (yes); Wallach
Sons, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 7 UCC REP. SERv. 141 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970) (no).
,1 Commercial Trading Co. v. Bassin (Inre Laminated Veneers Co.), 471 F.2d 1124
(2d Cir. 1973) (no); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 470 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1973)
(yes); Mammoth Cave Production Credit Ass'n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. 1968) (no).
,1 Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 277 A.2d 708 (Del. 1970) (no); Bank of
Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc., 317 N.Y.S.2d 542 (App. Div. 1971) (yes); Associates Dis-
count Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1970) (yes).
" Compare James Talcott, Inc. v. Associates Capital Co., 491 F.2d 879 (6th Cir.
1974) with Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States, 431 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1970).
" Divergence in decisional law under the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter
cited as UCCI before 1969 is discussed and documented in Note, supra note 8, at 774
app. Many controversies involve "basic building blocks" such as the definitional sec-
tions of the Code. Miller, Hints and Helps to be Found in Article 1 Definitions, 4 UCC
L.J. 223 (1972). The annual survey of commercial law decisions provided by The
Business Lawyer reflects many other conflicts in Code decisional law. See, e.g., 31 Bus.
LAW. 1517-1605 (1976); 30 Bus. LAw. 847-919 (1975); 29 Bus. LAw. 1225-1314 (1974);
28 Bus. LAW. 805-71 (1973); 27 Bus. LAw. 735-73 (1972).
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decisional law among the states. Thus, in an annual survey of
UCC decisional law one commentator recently remarked:
Most of the Article 9 developments during the last year were
in the mainstream of prior decisional law. However, this re-
cord of consistency and uniformity in interpreting and apply-
ing the Code was marred by a disturbing number of cases
which failed to apply established Code principles in resolving
secured transaction disputes. In some of these cases, the
courts appear to have been guided by a desire to produce a
result which would comport with a sense of justice and equity
in the particular case. Others reflect a desire to prevent re-
ceipt of a windfall by one of the competing claimants. Unfor-
tunately, however, the part of reasoning followed by these
courts in resolving the particular disputes will spawn inevita-
ble uncertainty and nonuniformity as the Code is applied to
future cases.2"
The disparity in decisional law is compounded by variance
in the Code's language as it has been enacted in the various
states. During the enacting years state legislatures freely
amended the oificial text of the Code. In addition there has
been a general reluctance on the part of state legislators to
adopt the official amendments to the Code as they are periodi-
cally promulgated by the Code's Permanent Editorial Board.
This has resulted in substantial variations in the text of the
UCC in enacting states.22
C. Existing Disparity in the Commercial Law Among the
States
Uniformity of commercial law in the United States and,
for that matter, among nations 23 is unquestionably a laudable
objective. Absent important countervailing considerations, the
21 Burke, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: Secured Transactions, 31
Bus. LAW. 1583 (1S76).
2 See text accompanying notes 35-45 infra for a discussion of nonuniform state
enactment of the UCC.
23 The quest for uniformity of commercial law among states has an international
counterpart in the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods and in the Uniform
Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Both are
discussed in E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, CoMMERcIAL LAW CASES & MARLms, 14-
15 (3d ed. 1976).
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benefits of uniformity of law should not be ignored. There are,
however, two considerations which militate against uniformity:
(1) The uniqueness of a particular state's circumstances or pol-
icies and (2) pressures exerted by changing commercial prac-
tices.
Where local circumstances are sufficiently unique to man-
date a rule different from that contained in the official text of
the Code, one may properly conclude that the interest of na-
tional uniformity is outweighed. The drafters of the Code per-
ceived this limitation upon uniformity and provided for local
variations with respect to particular Code provisions. This is
illustrated in Section 2-318, 2 which takes a neutral position on
vertical privity; in Comment 4 to Section 3-202, where the legal
effect of a partial assignment is left to local law; and in Com-
ments 4 and 6 to Section 3-305,5 where illegality, duress, and
infancy are.declared to be of local concern and policy. In addi-
tion to areas carved out by the drafters for local variation, the
state judiciary and legislatures have declined to follov the offi-
cial text of the Code for reasons of perceived local policy consid-
erations. 6 There should be no objection to the disparity created
by variance in either statutory language or by decisional law if
the lawmaker has engaged in a careful balancing of interests
and has concluded that the uniformity mandate2 is outweighed
by clearly articulated local policy considerations. Such inter-
ests correctly limit the objective of uniformity.
A second factor which militates against uniformity of law
among the states is the pressure exerted by changing commer-
cial practices. Indeed, the inevitability of change in commer-
cial practice was a major reason for the obsolescence of the
Uniform Acts which preceded the UCC.2 1 Seeking to avoid or
24 UCC § 2-318 (1962 Official Text) and Comment 3.
Comment 4 to UCC § 3-305 (1962 Official Text) provides, in reference to the
defense of infancy: "Such questions are left to the local law, as an integral part of the
policy of each state as to the protection of infants." Comment 6 declares that duress
and illegality "are matters of local concern and local policy."
2S See text accompanying notes 35-45 infra for a discussion of nonuniform enact-
ment of the UCC.
2 One of the Code's declared purposes is "to make uniform the law among the
various jurisdictions." UCC § 1-102(2) (c) (1962 Official Text).
" Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341,
1341-47 (1948); Comment 1 to UCC § 3-101 (1962 Official Text).
1977]
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to minimize the impact of future changes in practice upon the
utility of the Code, the draftsmen provided that one of the
underlying purposes of the Code was "to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practice through custom, usage and
agreement of parties."29 This purpose is further stated as fol-
lows:
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it
is intended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will
provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial prac-
tices. It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied
in this Act to be developed by the Courts in light of unfore-
seen and new circumstances and practices."
In the abstract, the Code's twin aims of growth and uni-
formity" are to be achieved through a liberal construction
which promotes the Code's purposes and policies." The imme-
diate problem, of course, is that the underlying purposes and
policies of the Code are not in complete harmony. Uniformity
implies certainty in law and, to some extent, inflexibility in
judicial decision making. Uniformity thus limits the mandate
to construe liberally,3 particularly in the context of autono-
mous jurisdictions. If, however, the courts take too wooden a
view of precedent or if they blindly follow the decisions of sister
states, and if the legislatures of the states mechanically follow
the pronouncements of the Code's Permanent Editorial Board,
the Code could become obsolete within a short period of time.
There is a need to keep the Code responsive to the needs of a
constantly-changing commercial environment. An inevitable
UCC § 1-102(2) (b) (1962 Official Text).
UCC § 1-102, Comment 1 (1962 Official Text).
31 Vold, Construing the Uniform Commercial Code: Its Own Twin Keys: Uniform-
ity and Growth, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 49 (1964).
32 UCC § 1-102(1) (1962 Official Text) provides that: "This Act shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies." Further em-
phasis is placed upon construction:
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purpose and
policies. The text of each section should be read in light of the purpose and
policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and
the application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as
the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved.
UCC § 1-102, Comment 1 (1962 Official Text).
3 This limitation was recognized in a federal case, In re Broward Auto Brokers,
Inc., 11 UCC REp. SERv. 402, 404 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
[Vol. 65
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by-product of providing for change, however, is a degree of
disparity in the commercial laws of the states.
If the current disparity in commercial law were entirely
attributable to variance in local policy and to changing com-
mercial practice, there would be no need for concern. However,
a great deal of the divergence in commercial law cannot be
justified in terms of these important interests and should there-
fore be eliminated. Many of the litigated issues are fairly pe-
destrian and do not involve important policy considerations.3 4
In such cases there is a strong need for a clear statement of
uniform rules which will be given force and effect in all states.
II. THE FAILURE TO ACHiEVE UNIFORMITY OF COMMERCIAL LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
It is important to examine in detail the various factors
which accofnt for the current variance in' the commercial law
of the states in order to consider what can and ought to be done
in the interest of greater uniformity.
A. State Legislation
Measured by the interest of national uniformity, the state
legislatures have failed in three ways: The official version of the
Uniform Commercial Code has been too freely amended; offi-
cial amendments to the UCC as periodically promulgated by
the Code's Permanent Editorial Board have not been enacted;
and new state statutes which vary or supersede Code provisions
have been promulgated.
1. Nonuniform Enactment
The UCC was not enacted as promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners and the American Law Institute35
3 See text accompanying note 9 supra for an example of a litigated issue which
does not involve important policy considerations.
Although the first integrated draft of the Code was completed in 1949 and an
amended version was approved by both the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1951, it was not until 1952 that
the first "Official Text" was promulgated. The 1952 Official Text was followed in 1955
with Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official Text. During the enacting years amended
versions of the Code appeared as follows: 1957 Official Text, 1958 Official Text, 1962
1977]
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due to the fact that legislatures of the various states freely
amended its provisions during the enacting process. 6 Although
the Code had been adopted by only six states 37 between 1953
and 1960, it was apparent by 1961 "that almost every state
enacting the Code was making its own amendments, thus very
largely imperiling the primary object of the Code which is UNI-
FORMITY in the laws of the various states regulating commer-
cial transactions. ' 3 Because of this emerging problem, a Per-
manent Editorial Board (PEB) for the UCC was formed by
agreement between the American Law Institute and the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners9.3  The PEB was charged
Official Text, 1966 Official Recommendations for Amendments. The uniformity prob-
lem was compounded by the fact that the states enacted different versions of the
Official Text. For example, in 1963, a year after the publication of the 1962 Official
Text, Nebraska enacted the 1958 Official Text.
31 Approximately 775 nonuniform amendments had been made by the time the
Code was enacted in 49 states. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and
Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIMI L. REv. 1, 10 (1967). "By
November of 1966 there had been 337 nonuniform amendments to the various sections
of Article 9." PERMANENT EDrroRAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REP.
No. 3, at X (1966) [hereinafter cited as PEB REP. No. 3]. Nonuniform amendments
to Article 9 of the UCC provided one of the primary motives for the 1972 revision of
that Article:
The revision of Article 9 is the result of several years' work by the Article 9
Review Committee and the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code. The study that produced the revised version of Article 9
was initiated by the Permanent Editorial Board after consideration of a
report showing that more than 300 nonuniform, nonofficial amendments had
been made to various sections of Article 9 in the adopting jurisdictions.The
Board regarded this as a "distressing situation." The Board also took note
of suggestions in articles and textbooks for improvements in Article 9. A
"restudy in depth of Article 9" was recommended, and the Article 9 Review
Committee was appointed to undertake it.
UCC REP. SERv., State Correlation and Code Index Vol., Appendix to Article 9 at page
1.
37 In chronological order, the UCC was adopted by Pennsylvania, Massachusetts,
Kentucky, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island; 1961 saw the Code
adopted by eight additional states.
s PERMANENT VDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REP. No. 1,
at 8 (1962) [hereinafter cited as PEB REp. No. 1].
*1 The Agreement is dated August 5, 1961, and is reproduced in PEB REP. No. 1,
supra note 38, at 11 et seq. In pertinent part, the Agreement provided that:
It shall be the policy of the Board to assist in attaining and maintaining
uniformity in state statutes governing commercial transactions and to this
end to approve a minimum number of amendments to the Code. Amend-
ments shall be approved and promulgated when
(a) It has been shown by experience under the Code that a partic-
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with the obligation to "assist in attaining and maintaining
uniformity in state statutes governing commercial transactions
.... "40 The agreement provided that the PEB would approve
or promulgate amendments to the official text of the UCC in
very limited circumstances." However, there is very little that
can be done, either by the PEB or by the National Conference
of Commissioners, to prevent legislators of the various states
from adopting nonuniform amendments to the Code.2 Al-
though the PEB has systematically rejected the vast majority
of local amendments to the official text of the Code,43 the PEB
and the National Conference are without authority to impose
their ideas upon state legislatures." In addition, there are no
means by which either the PEB or the National Conference of
Commissioners can compel the states to adopt the uniform
amendments to the official text which have been approved by
the PEB.5
2. Failure to Follow Recommendations of the Permanent
Editorial Board
If the state legislatures were to defer to the pronounce-
ular provision is unworkable or for any other reason obviously re-
quires amendment; or
(b) Court decisions have rendered the correct interpretation of a
provision of the Code doubtful and an amendment can clear up the
doubt; or
(c) New commercial practices shall have rendered any provisions
of the Code obsolete or have rendered new provisions desirable.
41 Id.
41 Id.
42 For an analysis of nonuniform amendments, see Schnader, The Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Can It Accomplish Its Objects?, 3
AM. Bus. L.J. 137 (1965); Braucher, The Uniform Commercial Code-A Third Look,
14 W. Rzs. L. REV. 7 (1962).
" See PEB REPORTS for 1962, 1964, and 1966.
" When the PEB determines that amendments are called for, the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is charged with the responsibility for
subsequent enactment. PEB REP. No. 1, supra note 38, at 13 (Agreement, paragraph
"Eighth").
" The PEB has considered the problem of getting such amendments adopted. For
example, in rejecting all nonuniform amendments in its Report No. 2 of 1964, the
Board states: "But experience has taught those interested in the uniformity of our
statutory law that it has been much easier to get 'uniform laws' on the books in the
first instance than it has been to interest legislatures in bringing them up to date by
amendment." PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REP.
No. 2, at 12 (1964).
1977]
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ments of the Permanent Editorial Board, the lack of uniformity
in statutory language among the states could be periodically
removed by the simple expedient of repealing the old, some-
what adulterated versions of the Code and substituting a uni-
form revision. Unfortunately, however, the recommendations
of the PEB go unheeded,46 as is vividly illustrated by the cur-
rent disposition of the 1972 Official Text of the Code. The 1972
version contains the first major revisions of Article 9, Secured
Transactions; 7 yet, as of July, 1976, it has been enacted in less
than one-third of the states." Ironically, therefore, the promul-
gation of the 1972 Official Text may have an effect exactly the
opposite of that intended: it may prove to be a permanent
source of disparity in commercial law since it produces sub-
stantial variance between enacting and non-enacting states.
3. Superseding State and Federal Legislation
The Code has become superseded and supplemented by
both state and federal legislation. While the Code's uniformity
mandate is not ill-served by the enactment of other "uniform"
4' Id.
" See generally Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REV. 477 (1973);
Dawson, The 1972 Amendments to Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Attachment and Enforceability, Future Advances, and Proceeds, 54 Oa. L. REv. 251
(1975).
Is It was recently reported that the following states have adopted the 1972 revision:
Arizona (Laws of 1975, Ch. 65), effective January 1, 1976.
Arkansas (Acts of 1973, Act 116), effective January 1, 1974.
California (Statutes of 1974, Ch. 997), effective January 1, 1976.
Connecticut (Pub. Act. no. 76-369), effective October 1, 1976.
Illinois (Laws of 1972, Pub. Act. No. 77-2810), effective July 1, 1973.
Iowa (Acts of 1974, Senate File 1315), effective January 1, 1975.
Kansas (Laws of 1975, S.B. 271), effective January 1, 1976.
Minnesota (Laws of 1976, Ch. 135), effective January 1, 1976.
Nevada (Laws of 1973, Ch. 569), effective July 1, 1975.
North Carolina (Sess. Laws 1975, Ch. 862), effective July 1, 1976.
North Dakota (Laws of 1973, Ch. 343), effective January 1, 1974.
Oregon (Laws of 1973, Ch. 504), effective January 1, 1974.
Texas (Laws of 1973, Ch. 400), effective January 1, 1974.
Virginia (Laws of 1973, Ch. 509), effective July 1, 1974.
West Virginia (Laws of 1974, Ch. 143), effective July 1, 1974.
Wisconsin (Laws of 1973, Ch. 215), effective July 1, 1974.
UCC REP. SERv. State Correlation and Code Index Vol., Appendix to Article 9 at page
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state statutes or by federal legislation, 49 the uniformity of law
under the UCC is damaged every time a state legislature enacts
a nonuniform statute which supersedes or supplements Code
provisions. Today, there is more and more legislation of this
type, particularly in the regulation of consumer transactions.
The impact of such statutes upon uniformity is compounded
by the judicial tendency to construe the Code as in pari materia
with non-Code legislation." Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio
managed to avoid the clear language of Section 9-310 and to
give a security interest priority over a common law artisan's
lien by reasoning based on other state statutes.5' In construing
the Code in pari materia with the Texas Certificate of Title
Act, the Texas courts have found that the Act takes precedence
over the general provisions of Section 9-110,12 but that Section
9-307 takes precedence over the Act..3 A referee in bankruptcy
refused to read the Connecticut Certificate of Title Act as re-
quiring that a security agreement be dated;54 but a referee in
Florida concluded that a state statute outside the Code re-
quired a future advance clause to specify the maximum
amount of advance as a condition to validity.55 Other courts
have, however, taken the correct position that the Code, in
general, is not to be varied by reference to other statutes. 6 Yet,
1' The Code has been superseded by federal law since the outset. See, e.g., G.
GILMORE, 1 SECuRrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 401-34 (1965). An example of
more recent legislation that supersedes the UCC is the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1975). The impact of this Act upon UCC § 2-318 is explored in
Note, Horizontal Privity Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: A Practitioner's
Guide, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 775, 781-84 (1972-73). Another illustration of how UCC
provisions are varied by federal legislation may be seen in recent amendments to the
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. See Act of Sept. 13, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-410, §
206(a), 90 Stat. 1251 (1976). Section 206(a) (to be codified as 7 U.S.C. § 195) purport-
edly would change the effect of UCC § 2-702.
50 See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Whisnant, 4 UCC REP. SERV.
1016 (5th Cir. 1968); In re McGovern, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 234 (D. Conn. 1969); Asso-
ciates Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1970); GMC
Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Irving Bank & Trust Co., 463 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.
1971).
, Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Berry, 207 N.E.2d 545 (Ohio 1965).
52 GMC Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Irving Bank & Trust Co., 463 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971).
0 Associates Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.
1970).
5 In re McGovern, 6 UCC RaP. SERV. 234 (D. Conn. 1969).
5 In re Sanelco, 7 UCC REP. SERv. 65 (Fla. 1969).
5, For example, within a year of the effective date of the Code in Kentucky, the
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the enactment of statutes which supersede or supplement Code
provisions and the in pari materia construction of the Code
with such statutes provide real threats to uniformity of law
among the states.
B. Judicial Decisions
The lack of uniform commercial law among the states is
not due solely to the actions and inactions of state legislatures;
the judiciary has also disserved Code objectives by its failure
to develop a technique of decision-making on Code questions
which is highly responsive to the uniformity mandate. This is
reflected in the conflicting interpretations and constructions of
identical statutory language. 51
In seeking to draft a "semi-permanent piece of legisla-
tion""8 with its "own machinery for expansion," 9 a code which
could be applied flexibly to unforeseen transactions,0 the draf-
Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether various state statutes im-
posed requirements for the perfection and recording of security interests in addition
to those contained in the UCC. Despite the fact that the statutes had not been ex-
pressly repealed, the Court adopted the following position:
The Code represents an entirely new approach in several areas of com-
mercial law, and especially as to security transactions. Its adoption in this
state signifies a legislative policy to join with other states in achieving uni-
formity. Code § 1-102(2)(c). The realization of this purpose demands that
so far as possible the meaning of the law be gathered from the instrument
itself, unfettered by anachronisms indigenous to the respective jurisdictions
in which it is in force. Accepting that principle, we adopt as a rule of con-
struction that the Code is plenary and exclusive except where the legislature
has clearly indicated otherwise (citations omitted).
Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 334 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Ky. 1961). A similar
approach to construction was taken in an opinion of the Attorney General of Nebraska:
If there appears to be some conflict between the filing provisions of this
act and other general statutes, the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Act
will control. The act is a new, independent and complete act dealing with a
special subject and in such cases prevails over statutes general in nature
which may be in conflict with the special act.
Op. Arr'y GEN. No. 118-65, 3 UCC REP. SERv. 110 (Neb. 1965). See also Op. ATr'Y GEN.
No. 70-261, 8 UCC REP. SERv. 430 (Okla. 1970) (concluding that the Code takes preced-
ence over an Oklahoma statute requiring formal acknowledgment as a condition to the
effective filing of an instrument affecting real estate).
5 See text accompanying notes 8-20 supra for examples of issues upon which there
are currently conflicts in decisional law.
" UCC § 1-102, Comment 1 (1952 Official Text).
59 Id.
60 Id.
THE ERODING UNIFORMITY
ters had little choice but to formulate the Code in general lan-
guage.' Because the Code provides only a general framework
and often establishes rules and standards without elaboration,
the application of the Code to particular factual situations re-
sults in questions of both interpretation and construction. 2 In
their efforts to reconcile ambiguous Code provisions and to
elaborate and apply the Code's general framework to specific
cases, the courts may consult a wide variety of materials which
include Code Comments, state legislative history, pre-Code
statutory and decisional law, prior versions of the Code and its
Comments, and the decisional law of sister states.63
It is the obligation of the courts to elaborate and apply the
law in a reasonable, consistent and uniform manner, but the
courts have failed to fulfill this responsibility with respect to
6 In an early article, Grant Gilmore found it a "matter of vital importance that
the Code as a whole be kept in terms of such generality as to allow an easy and
unstrained application of its provisions to new patterns of business behavior." Gilmore,
On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341, 1355 (1948).
82 The term "interpretation" usually refers to ascertaining the meaning of statu-
tory language, while the term "construction" refers to determining whether the statute
has application to a given transaction or occurrence.
0 An additional aid to the interpretation and construction of the Code may be
found in the work of the New York Law Revision Commission (N.Y.L.R.C.). This work
is particularly significant since the Code was redrafted in light of criticisms voiced
before the N.Y.L.R.C. The Commission published its works in several volumes and
separate reports: 1-2 STATE OF NEW YORK, N.Y.L.R.C. HEARINGS (1954), supra note 1;
1-3 STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1955) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.L.R.C. STUDY (1955)];
STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REvISION COMMISSION, REPORT RELATING TO
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1956).
The work of the N.Y.L.R.C. is discussed in Braucher, The Legislative History of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 798, 803 (1958). See also Schnader,
A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code,
22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1967); Beutel, Interpretation, Construction, and Revision
of the Commercial Code: The Presumption of Holding in Due Course, 1966 WASH.
U.L.Q. 381, 382.
The 1956 Official Text of the Code contained changes in over two-thirds of the
1952 sections. Many of the changes were expressly in response to criticism by the
N.Y.L.R.C. See Beutel, supra, at 384 nn. 19 & 20, wherein he states:
The actual percentage of changes was 69%, divided as follows: Article 1,
General Provisions, 59%; Article 2, Sales, 61%; Article 3, Commercial Paper,
48%; Article 4, Bank Collections, 77%; Article 5, Letters of Credit, 100%;
Article 6, Bulk Transfers, 80%; Article 7, Documents of Title, 72%; Article
8, Investment Securities, 80%; Article 9, Secured Transactions, 95%; Article
10, Effective Date and Repealer, 50%. . .. Out of 228 changes where sources
of criticism are mentioned 134 (or 59%) refer to the N.Y.L.R.C. by name.
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the interpretation and construction of the Code. Their failure
may be attributed in part to their lack of a reasoned approach
to dealing with the various aids to interpretation and construc-
tion of the Code. It is therefore necessary to examine the judi-
cial use of Code Comments, pre-Code statutory and decisional
law, and the decisional law of sister states.
1. Code Comments
Official texts of the UCC have always been accompanied
by drafters' Comments. Although the current text of the Code
makes no reference to the Comments, 4 the Comments provide
a means for substantial uniformity of Code construction.15 Yet
from the perspective of interpretation and construction of the
Code, the Comments have several shortcomings. The "official"
Comments cannot be regarded as expressing the intent of the
state legislatures: they were not enacted by the state legisla-
tures; they were not formally considered by the legislatures
prior to the Code enactment; and, in fact, some Comments
were drafted only after the enactment of the Code.6" Further-
"4 The 1952 edition of the Code included Section 1-102(3)(f), which declared, "The
Comments'of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Law Institute may be consulted in the construction and application of
this Act but, if text and Comment conflict, text controls." Throughout the drafting of
the Code, the Comments ran into difficulties, aptly characterized by the following
statement: "The decision to give an official quasi-statutory status to the Comments is
unfortunate. The statutory draftsman, like the common law dog, is entitled to only one
bite. Statutes should not come equipped with an elaborate law-review apparatus
.. " Gilmore, supra note 28, at 1355.
The N.Y.L.R.C. objected to the Code's explicit reference to the Comments. 1
N.Y.L.R.C. STuDY (1955), supra note 63, at 156-63.
In response to such criticisms, the 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board
deleted all textual references to the Comments, explaining only that by 1956, the 1952
Comments "were out of date and it [was] not known when new ones could be pre-
pared." 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 3 (1957) (section 1-102(3)).
11 Notwithstanding the expressed reasons for including the Comments, they were
at least in part attributed to the experience with Williston's treatises on sales, which
had been regarded as stating the legislative intent of the Uniform Sales Act. Braucher,
supra note 63, at 808. See also S. WILLISTON, SALES (1909); S. WILLISTON, SALES (rev.
ed. 1948).
11 See E.A. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, COMMERCIAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS,
8, 10 (2d ed. 1968), in which, after describing the Comments as "[a] hazard for the
lazy mind, and a help for the responsible lawyer. . .," the authors go on to state:
Embarrassing questions multiply if one subjects the Comments to the stan-
dards often imposed for recourse to legislative history. In some states the
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more, Comments often are misplaced, expand the text, are
inconsistent with the text, and have even referred to non-
existent text sections."7
One source of the lack of uniform decisional law under the
Code has been the divergent judicial treatment of the Code
Comments. States are divided on such basic questions as
whether it is even appropriate for courts to consult the Com-
ments. The Georgia Court of Appeals has made it clear that the
Comments are entitled to considerable weight. Indeed, in one
case that court suggested that the Comments were binding."
In contrast, the courts of Colorado are barred from considering
the Comments by a statute which provides that "[tihe inclu-
sion of said nonstatutory matter [the official Comments] shall
be for the purpose of information and no implication or pre-
sumption of legislative intent shall be drawn therefrom." 9 The
Colorado Court of Appeals has apparently acquiesced in the
prohibition. 0 Still other courts find the Comments persuasive
but not binding.7' Many courts have found that the Comments
revised Comments had not yet been drafted at the time of the Code's adop-
tion. In others it is highly doubtful that the Comments were laid before the
legislators in the form of a committee report explaining the legislation which
the legislators were asked to adopt.
91 For an extended discussion and analysis of many problems with the Comments,
see Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966
Wis. L. REv. 597. In a non-exhaustive categorization of the Comments on a functional
basis, Professor Skilton found them to be of three overlapping types: "(1) Exposi-
tory-seeking to describe the meaning and application of a section of the Code and its
relationship with the other sections, or (2) Gap-filling-seeking to suggest answers to
questions not precisely covered by the text, or (3) Promotional and argumenta-
tive-seeking to "sell" a controversial section." Id. at 608.
'1 In Kramer v. Johnson, 176 S.E.2d 108 (Ga. App. 1970), the Georgia Court of
Appeals stated, "The legislature had the benefit of the drafter's interpretations when
it enacted the Code and we cannot say that it intended something else." Id. at 109.
For other Georgia cases, see Jinright v. Russell, 9 UCC R8P. SERv. 455 (Ga. App. 1971);
Warren's Kiddie Shoppe, Inc. v. Casual Slacks, Inc., 171 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. App. 1969).
" COLO. REV. STAT. § 135-4-73(2) (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1965).
, American Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Tina Marie Homes, Inc., 476 P.2d 573, 577
(Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (the quoted language of the statute is repeated in the "Preface").
1' Bickett v. W. R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972),
contains a typical statement: "The official Comments, while not binding upon the
courts, are persuasive matters of interpretation to help further the underlying purposes
of the Uniform Commercial Code of making the law uniform among the various juris-
dictions." Id. at 642 [citations omitted]. See also Thompson v. United States, 498
F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1969); Burchett v. Allied Concord Financial Corp., 396 P.2d 186
(N.M. 1964).
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are of assistance,7 2 or should be considered,73 or that they pro-
vide a guide for Code construction." Federal courts have found
the Comments to be "powerful dicta"" and an appropriate
source of federal law.7" Yet, these declarations show little more
than that the Comments are generally considered relevant.
An examination of cases in which the courts have dis-
cussed the Comments reveals a disturbing fact: generally, the
courts do not feel obligated to engage in an express and rea-
soned discussion as to why a particular Comment should or
should not be followed. Too frequently, judges do not identify
the reasons which explain their following or bypassing of an
interpretation suggested by unambiguous Code Comments.
The judicial failure to expressly discuss the weight given to the
Code Comments was first revealed in a series of Pennsylvania
lower court decisions dealing with the question of whether the
sale of a restaurant was within the scope of Article 6, Bulk
Transfers. In the first Code case the court relied upon pre-Code
decisional law and found the restaurant covered by Article 6.11
The court considered neither the language of Section 6-102 nor
the Comments to this section, which clearly state that a res-
taurant is not within the scope of the Article. Five years later
in another restaurant case, a Pennsylvania lower court rejected
an argument based on the Comment by saying, "Notwith-
standing such comment, it suffices to say that it is not con-
trolling and that the courts have not followed the comment." 8
In a case dealing with the privity requirement and breach
of warranties, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed suit
by refusing to consider or to give weight to the Comments to
Section 2-318, stating, "The comment to the Code. . .which
is the basis for the argument that the language of Section 2-
22 Farley v. Clark Equipment Co., 484 S.W.2d 142, 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
'a Warren's Kiddie Shoppe, Inc. v. Casual Slacks, Inc., 171 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1969).
" In re Rivet, 299 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
" In re Varney Wood Products, Inc., 458 F.2d 435 (4th Cir. 1972); In re Yale
Express System, Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
71 In re Laboratory Precision Products, Inc., 4 UCC REp. SERv. 1139 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
77 Uhr v. 3361, Inc., 1 UCC REP. SEr. 314 (Pa. Com. P1. 1960).
" Zinni v. One Township Line Corp., 3 UCC REP. SERv. 305 (Pa. Com. P1. 1965).
[Vol. 65
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318 is precatory only was never enacted by the Pennsylvania
legislature."79 Two years later, again faced with the vertical
privity issue and the Comment to Section 2-318, the court
reached a result different from its earlier decision. 0 In so doing,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared:
The answer to this question is provided in the clearest of
language by the drafters of the code in comment 3 to Section
2-318. Merely to say that our Legislature never enacted the
comments into law does not, of course, preclude this Court
from examining them to ascertain the proper meaning of a
statute.'
In 1971, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that
"[ilt is settled in this Commonwealth that the official com-
ments of a commission drafting legislation may be given
weight ... ."I' The next year, a Pennsylvania Superior Court
faced with a dissenting opinion which relied upon the Com-
ments to Section 3-403, stated that "[w]e should not overlook
[the fact] that the text of the Code was enacted by the legisla-
ture; the comments were not."8
The defect in these Pennsylvania decisions is not that they
either should or should not have followed the Comments;.
rather, it is the haphazard approach by which the courts found
that the Comments could be considered, but that, since they
were not enacted, they could also be ignored. Such an approach
is in breach of the judicial obligation to decide cases in a rea-
soned manner. Uniformity is an objective of the codification of
commercial law, and the Comments were made available to
assist in reaching that objective. When relevant, Comments
should always be considered. 4 Whether they should be fol-
lowed is an entirely separate question. If a Comment is not to
*' Miller v. Preitz, 221 A.2d 320, 325 (Pa. 1966).
* Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1968).
52 Id. at 855. In support of its consultation of the Comments, the court cited In re
Tarlo's Estate, 172 A. 139, 140-41 (Pa. 1934).
'* Young v. Kaye, 279 A.2d 759, 765 n.3 (Pa. 1971) (emphasis added).
Trenton Trust Co. v. Klausmann, 296 A.2d 275, 277 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972).
, A reasoned approach to the UCC Comments may be seen in several cases. See,
e.g., In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc., 9 UCC REP. SERv. 1313 (9th Cir. 1971); Wright v. Bank
of Cal., 6 UCC REP. SERv. 1165 (Cal. App. 1969) (plain language of § 3-405 cannot be
varied by reference to Comments); Burchett v. Allied Concord Financial Corp., 396
P.2d 186 (N.M. 1964).
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be followed, the courts should expressly state the reasons there-
fore in their written opinions. This approach would further
uniformity by providing both practitioner and judge not with
an arbitrary picking and choosing among Comments, but with
a firm understanding of the criteria by which a court decides
to follow or bypass the interpretations and constructions sug-
gested by the Comments.
2. Pre-Code Statutory and Decisional Law
The use of pre-Code statutory and decisional law as an aid
to Code interpretation and construction tends to perpetuate
the lack of uniformity which characterized the commercial law
of the past. Although several courts have recognized this threat
to uniformity,85 others have resolved Code questions by resort
to the pre-Code law of their state86 under the authority of Sec-
The Supreme Court of Oregon recently stated:
One of the prime purposes of the Code was to create a statutory scheme
incorporating within its provisions the complete regulation of certain types
of commercial dealings. This purpose would be blunted if the rules created
by some pre-Code decisions and not expressly provided for in the statutory
scheme were nevertheless grafted onto the Code by implication. In Evans
Products v. Jorgensen, 235 Ore. 362, 372, 421 P.2d 978 [3 UCC Rep. 1099]
(1966), we held generally that we would not engage in this practice.
Seattle-First National Bank v. Oregon Pacific Indus., Inc., 22 UCC REP. Smav. 270, 272
(Ore. 1972).
Many other courts have refused to apply pre-Code statutory and decisional law.
See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Colwell Diesel Service & Garage, Inc.,
12 UCC REP. SERV. 226 (Me. 1973) (to read a consent requirement into § 9-310 would
deprive that Section of the Act of any meaning); Nickell v. Lambrecht, 185 N.W.2d
155 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (court refused to apply pre-Code decisional law that re-
quired consent of secured party as a requisite to artisan acquiring a lien). Other courts,
without mentioning the threat to uniformity of law, have refused to apply pre-Code
decisions: First State Bank of Nora Springs v. Waychus, 183 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1971)
(pre-Code constructive notice cases under former chattel mortgage recording acts
found not to be authoritative under the Code); Thompson Maple Products, Inc. v.
Citizens National Bank of Correy, 234 A.2d 32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967) (language of the
new Act is determinative in all cases arising under it; pre-Code law would not be
applied).
11 Numerous courts have looked to pre-Code law. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc.
v. L. D. Schreiber Cheese Co., 326 F. Supp. 504, 509 n.13 (W.D. Mo. 1971), reo'd on
other grounds, 457 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1972) (court cited § 1-103 in support of the
proposition that pre-Code Missouri cases should be considered as supplementary to the
Code); Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (court found
support in the common law of Pennsylvania which is "retained by the Commercial
Code as authoritative where not expressly superseded by it"); Kaiser Trading Co. v.
Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (prior case law
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tion 1-103 which provides that "[u]nless displaced by the par-
ticular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity
. . . shall supplement its provisions."
When a court refers to pre-Code law as supplementing the
Code, it is necessary to distinguish between two quite different
approaches. In the first, pre-Code decisional and statutory law
is deemed to fill the gaps of the Code and to assist in the
interpretation and construction of the Code in much the same
way as do the other aids to interpretation and construction.87
This is an arguably correct approach, although in the interest
of uniformity, one might counter, reasoning by analogy88 from
the Code is a preferable way to fill the gaps, and matters of
interpretation and construction should be resolved by resort-
ing to aids which are not local in character. In the second
approach, the court deems pre-Code statutory and decisional
law to be the accurate statement of the law unless clearly dis-
placed by the Code.89 This approach is simply another way of
stating that statutes in derogation of the common law should
be strictly construed; it obviously militates against uniformity
and should, therefore, be abandoned.
3. Decisional Law of Sister States
On UCC questions there is no "supreme court" which can
reconcile variance in state decisional law. In the absence of
such a central authority, uniformity can be approached as a
considered in conjunction with decisions in other jurisdictions); Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 493 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973) (citing § 1-103, the court looked to the common law of Missouri to determine
the liability of an auctioneer for breach of warranty of title); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner
Machinery Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (citing § 1-103, the court
assumed that pre-Code law controls on the question of whether the seller of second-
hand merchandise warrants the goods).
" See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L. D. Schreiber Cheese Co., 326 F. Supp. 504
(W.D. Mo. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 457 F.2d 962 (1972).
0 On reasoning by analogy from the Code, see Comment 1 to § 1-102; Note,
Uniform Commercial Code Commentary, Uniformity of the Commercial Code, 8 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REv. 568 (1967); Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise
for Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 880 (1965).
" See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 323 N.Y.S.2d 13
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971). Commenting on decisions in other jurisdictions, the court notes
that in some of the jurisdictions, decisional law had developed under the Uniform Sales
Act, and "the failure to refer to it and to describe how it had been changed by the new
statutory language surely undermines the authority of those cases." Id. at 17.
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matter of decisional law only through a process in which the
courts give reasoned consideration to the decisional law of sis-
ter states. A mechanical following of such decisions is not to be
advocated; still, there are few situations in which such deci-
sions should not be followed."
The courts have taken clearly divergent positions with re-
spect to the decisional law of sister states. At one extreme some
courts have felt compelled to consult" or to follow9 2 such deci-
sions, while at the other extreme relevant decisions of sister
states have been ignored.93 In the vast middle ground, there has
been a multiplicity of approaches: some courts simply note the
uniformity provision and follow the decisions of sister states;9
others have found such decisions to be entitled to weight 5 or
to be of more than persuasive authority; 8 still other courts
simply find it proper that they be considered. 7
The failure of courts to consider the decisional law of sister
states in a reasoned manner places an almost insurmountable
barrier in the path of attaining uniformity of decisional law
among the states. Such decisions should be considered the
10 See text accompanying notes 23-34 supra for a discussion of the situations in
which the decisions of sister states should not be followed.
" See, e.g., In re Carmichael Enterprises, Inc. 334 F. Supp. 94, 99 n.7 (N.D. Ga.
1971), aff'd mem., 460 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1972) (the absence of any Georgia decisions
on the issue, coupled with the desire for uniformity, "compels the court to examine
the decisions of other Uniform Commercial Code jurisdictions").
92 See, e.g., Needle v. Lasco Indus., Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 593, 595 (Ct. App. 1970)
(since uniformity is an objective, decisions of other jurisdictions are "compelling au-
thority which we accept"); L.V. Co. v. Asch, 297 A.2d 285, 288 (Md. Ct. App. 1972)
(in a case of first impression, and in light of the uniformity provision, the court will
not depart from the "impressive array of authorities").
,1 See Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 13 UCC REP. SERv. 809 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973) (criti-
cized by the editors of the UCC Reporting Service, the case ignores relevant nonforum
decisions, notwithstanding citation to the uniformity provision).
'1 See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n Security Pac. Nat'l Bank,
100 Cal. Rptr. 438 (Ct. App. 1972); Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 278 N.E.2d 608
(Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
15 See Layton Inv. Co. v. Harris (In re Fed. Wholesale Meats & Frozen Foods,
Inc.), 168 N.W.2d 70, 73 (Wis. 1969) (citing the uniformity provisions, the court fol-
lowed a Pennsylvania case, declaring that the case "is properly given weight").
16 See A. J. Armstrong Co. v. Janburt Embroidery Corp., 234 A.2d 737, 744 (N.J.
Super Ct. 1967) (in light of the uniformity provision, "sister-state interpretations of
the Code are more than mere persuasive authority").
,1 See, e.g., In re Glenwood Packing Co., 4 UCC Ryp. SERV. 884 (S.D. Iowa 1967);
In re Osborn, 6 UCC REP. SERv. 227 (W.D. Mich. 1969); Evans v. Everett, 179 S.E.2d
120 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 183 S.E.2d 109 (N.C. 1971).
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most compelling authority. The second court to address an
issue should be concerned with determining whether or not the
decision of its sister state is acceptable in light of the Code's
language, purposes, and policies and in light of the various aids
to the interpretation and construction of the Code. If the deci-
sion of a sister state withstands this analysis," it should be
followed even though the second court favors an approach or
construction which is arguably better. Uniformity, in short,
requires that judges not feel free to treat Code questions as
matters of first impression when the issues have been pre-
viously addressed in the courts of another state. Such deference
to the opinions of judges in other states would help eliminate
a great deal of disparity in decisional law. When the inevitable
conflicts of authority do arise, it should be the PEB which
assumes the role of arbiter, resolving the dispute by the pro-
mulgation of official amendments to the Code.
Ill. CONCLUSION
As the states of the nation have become more economically
interdependent and as transactions have become more inter-
state in character, uniformity of commercial law has become
essential. Yet the uniformity which was initially engendered by
the widespread enactment of the Code has started to erode, to
the extent that, if current trends continue, the day may arrive
when the so-called Uniform Commercial Code will no longer
perform adequately its most basic function of providing uni-
formity in commercial law. In that event, federal enactment of
a commercial code will provide the only realistic means by
which commercial transactions will come to be governed by
uniform national rules."g Such an eventuality is undesirable
since the underlying premises of federalism are better served
if uniformity is achieved through the vehicle of uniform state
statutes. A great deal of unnecessary disparity in commercial
" For an example of a reasoned opinion which does not follow nonforum decisions,
see Kane-Miller Corp. v. Tip Tree Corp., 303 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1969) (rejecting Pennsyl-
vania cases holding the sale of a restaurant subject to Article 6, Bulk Transfers).
" Federal enactment of the UCC has been the subject of extended discussions over
the years. The topic was recently addressed in Kennedy, Federalism and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 29 Bus. LAw. 1225 (1974).
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law could be readily eliminated if state legislators and judges
were to direct their energies to such a goal.
State legislators should refrain from enacting statutes
which supersede or supplement the Code without first carefully
considering the impact of such legislation upon the Code's uni-
formity mandate. Furthermore, the legislators should enact the
official amendments to the text of the Code as promulgated by
the PEB, since such amendments serve the dual purpose of
updating the law and removing variance in decisional law.
Local statutory variations should be tolerated only where the
uniformity objective is outweighed by important local policy
considerations or by local variations in commercial practice. In
terms of the Code's twin aims of providing for uniformity and
growth in the law, the state legislatures have the ultimate re-
sponsibility for insuring the necessary uniformity.
The courts too must share in the responsibility for uni-
formity in commercial law. It is therefore suggested that judges
endeavor to take a more reasoned approach to Code comments
and to the decisional law of sister states.' 0 The judges, how-
ever, have an additional role to play, for upon their shoulders
must rest the UCC mandate that it be construed in light of
"unforeseen and new circumstances" and in light of new com-
mercial practice. It is the task of the courts, therefore, to recon-
cile the uniformity objective with the emerging needs for
change. From the standpoint of both state legislators and
judges, however, the road to uniformity demands a yielding of
autonomy and a greater recognition of the community of inter-
est among states.
1' This latter task is greatly facilitated by the existence of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code Reporting Service which, currently in 20 volumes, presents UCC-related
decisional law from all states.
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